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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
-v- : 
JOSE ZAVALA-PEREZ, : CASE NO. 20020079-CA 
Priority No. 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from misdemeanor convictions in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department, State of Utah, the Honorable 
William W. Barrett, Judge, presiding1. 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1999), which grants this Court jurisdiction in criminal cases not involving a conviction 
for a first degree or capital felony. Appellant/Defendant Jose Zavala-Perez was 
convicted of Driving Under the Influence, a class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1998), Speeding, a class C misdemeanor in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-46 Utah Code Ann. (1998), and Faulty Equipment, a class C 
misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-117 or 155 (1998). 
1See Sentence/Judgement/Commitment/Order R. 34 [attached hereto as Addendum 
"A"]. Judge L.A. Dever, who was covering Judge William Barrett's court at the time, 
denied Mr. Zavala-Perez' motion to strike bench trial and demanding jury trial, held the 
bench trial in absentia, and convicted Mr. Zavala-Perez. However, it was Judge Barrett 
who denied Mr. Zavala-Perez' motion to set aside the verdict and sentenced Mr. Zavala-
Perez, thereby retaining jurisdiction over the case. 
STATEMENT OF THE FIRST ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW. AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue: Did the trial court err in proceeding with a bench trial in absentia without 
determining whether Mr. Zavala-Perez received notice or was voluntarily absent? 
Standard of Review: Whether a defendant is properly tried in absentia is a 
question of law, which this Court reviews for correctness. See State v. Anderson, 929 
P.2d 1107, 1108 (Utah 1996) (citing Statev.Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)). 
Preservation of the Argument: This issue is preserved on the record at R. 24-33. 
STATEMENT OF THE SECOND ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW. AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue: Did the trial court err in determining that, by not maintaining contact with 
his appointed counsel prior to trial, Mr. Zavala-Perez had waived his right to a jury trial? 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a trial court's legal determinations non-
deferentially for correctness. See State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
Preservation of the Issue: This issue is preserved on the record at R. 17-20, 
24-33, and 53[1]. 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following provisions of the Utah Constitution are relevant on appeal. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 10 provides: 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In 
courts of general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of 
eight jurors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four 
jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases 
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three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be 
waived unless demanded. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12 provides, in pertinent part: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to . . . have 
a speedy public trial by an impartial jury in the county or district in which 
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. 
The following statutes are determinative of the issues on appeal. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-1-6(1999) 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 17 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 22 
The full text of these statutes are provided in Addendum "B." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Jose Zavala-Perez was charged by Information with Driving Under the Influence 
of Alcohol, Speeding, and Faulty Equipment. R. 2-4. Although a jury trial had 
originally been scheduled for September 12, 2001, the trial court determined that Mr. 
Zavala-Perez had waived his right to a jury trial by failing to maintain contact with his 
attorney, and re-scheduled this matter for a bench trial on October 29, 2001. R. 13-16, 
18. The bench trial was further continued to November 26, 2001. R. 17, 25, 53. 
On November 20,2001, Mr. Zavala-Perez filed a Motion to Strike Bench Trial 
and Demand for Trial by Jury. R. 17-20. On November 26,2001, the trial court denied 
that motion and held a bench trial in absentia. R. 53[1]. In his absence, the trial court 
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convicted Mr. Zavala-Perez on all counts. R. 53[35-36]. On December 28, 2001, Mr. 
Zavala-Perez filed a Motion to Set Aside Verdict and Grant a New Trial, which the trial 
court denied. R. 24-33. 
On January 17, 2002, Mr. Zavala-Perez filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 37-38. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 1, 2001, the State filed an Information charging Mr. Zavala-Perez with 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, Speeding, and Faulty Equipment, alleged to 
have occurred on February 17, 2001. R. 2-4. At a pretrial conference on June 18, 2001, 
Mr. Zavala-Perez, who required the aid of a Spanish interpreter, was unable to reach a 
disposition and verbally demanded a jury trial. R. 18-19. Pursuant to that demand, the 
trial court ordered that a jury trial be set on September 12, 2001. R. 9-12. The record 
does not contain any indication that Mr. Zavala-Perez received any warnings or 
admonishments received regarding his rights at that time. 
However, Mr. Zavala-Perez failed to contact his attorney prior to the trial date, 
and on September 12, the trial court continued the case and re-set it for a bench trial for 
October 29, 2001. R 13-18, 37. The trial court informed Mr. Zavala-Perez that, by not 
maintaining contact with his attorney, he had waived his right to a jury trial. R. 18. 
At some point prior to October 29,2001, Mr. Zavala-Perez' bench trial was 
continued to November 26, 2001. R. 53. This continuance was granted by the court on 
stipulation of counsel and without an appearance in court by Mr. Zavala-Perez. R. 17, 
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25-26. Furthermore, the record is devoid of any evidence that notice, either actual or 
constructive, was provided to Mr. Zavala-Perez regarding the new date for a bench trial. 
See e.g., R. 7-16; 25-26; 53[1]. Defense counsel, via an interpreter for Salt Lake Legal 
Defender Association, attempted to contact Mr. Zavala-Perez by telephone to inform him 
of the new date. R. 26. According to Mr. Zavala-Perez, he did speak with someone who 
told him that his October 29 trial had been continued and that they would call back in the 
future when his new date was known. Id. Although defense counsel had a current 
address and phone number for Mr. Zavala-Perez, no written notice of the new date was 
ever sent. Li In addition, in an attempt to contact his attorney prior to November 26, 
Mr. Zavala-Perez left a "stack of messages" with his attorney. R. 53 [1]. None of these 
phone calls were returned prior to the date of trial. IdL. 
On November 20, 2001, Mr. Zavala-Perez filed a motion to strike the bench trial 
and demanding a jury trial. R. 18-20. On November 26, 2001, without oral argument 
and without defense counsel or the defendant being present in the court, the trial court 
denied the motion. R. 53[1]. Once defense counsel arrived in court, he found that the 
motion had been denied and that Mr. Zavala-Perez was not present. R. 53[1]. No effort 
was made at that time to contact Mr. Zavala-Perez, to ascertain his location, or why he 
had not appeared in court. R. 53[1]. The trial court then proceeded to hold a bench trial 
in absentia and found Mr. Zavala-Perez guilty on all counts based on the testimony of the 
State's witnesses. R. 53[2-36]. Mr. Zavala-Perez and his wife were the only witnesses 
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the defense intended to call at trial. R. 28, 53[30-31]. As such, defense counsel was 
unable to present any evidence or defense. R. 53[30]. 
On December 28, 2001, Mr. Zavala-Perez filed a Motion to Set Aside Verdict and 
Grant a New Trial. R. 24-33. On January 14, 2002, the trial court denied Mr. Zavala-
Perez9 motion and sentenced him in absentia to 180 days in jail, 178 of which were 
suspended, a fine of $1300, forty hours of community service, DUI classes, and placed 
him on eighteen months of good behavior probation. R. 34. Mr. Zavala-Perez filed a 
timely notice of appeal. R. 37-38. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erroneously conducted a bench trial in Mr. Zavala-Perez9 absence. 
Trial in absentia infringes upon a defendant's right to be present under the state and 
federal constitutions and the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See State v. Anderson, 
929 P.2d 1107, 1109-10 (Utah 1996); Tavlor v. United States. 414 U.S. 17,20 (1973); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 17(a). While the right to be present may be waived, any waiver must 
be both knowing and voluntary. See State v. Wanosik. 2001 UT App. 241, T[10, 31 P.3d 
615. 
At an absolute minimum, knowing waiver requires that the defendant receive 
notice of the time, date, and place of the proceeding. See id. at ^19 n. 8. In the instant 
case, the record is silent as to whether Mr. Zavala-Perez received any notice of his bench 
trial on November 26, 2001. R. 7-16. Thus, his absence cannot be said to be knowing. 
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Further, even if a defendant has received notice of the proceedings, the trial court is 
required to conduct an inquiry into whether the defendant's absence is also voluntary. 
See idL [^19. The trial court made no such inquiry as to Mr. Zavala-Perez9 absence in this 
case. As such, the trial court erred in conducting a bench trial in absentia. Furthermore, 
as his absence prevented Mr. Zavala-Perez from presenting any evidence or mounting 
any defense, the trial court's error was prejudicial. 
Additionally, prior to conducting the bench trial in absentia, the trial court had 
erroneously concluded that Mr. Zavala-Perez had waived his right to a jury trial by 
failing to maintain contact with his attorney before trial. Mr. Zavala-Perez has a right to 
a jury trial under Article I, Sections 10 and 12 of the Utah Constitution. Waiver of a 
constitutional right must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See Colorado v. Spring. 
479 U.S. 564,579(1987). 
Furthermore, even if Mr. Zavala-Perez does not have a constitutional right to a 
jury trial, under Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (1999) and Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, criminal defendants are entitled to a trial by jury in all cases except 
infractions. See Salt Lake Citv v. Roseto. 2002 UT App. 66, ffi[ 8-14,44 P.3d 835. 
Waiver of a statutory right, although not as strict as a constitutional right, requires that 
"the record as a whole reflects the [defendant's] reasonable understanding of the 
proceedings and awareness of the right." State v. Byington, 936 P.2d 1112, 1117 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1997). 
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Whatever the source of Mr. Zavala-Perez' right to a jury trial, he simply did not 
waive this right. Although he failed to maintain contact with his attorney, Mr. Zavala-
Perez was present in court on the date and time of his scheduled jury trial. R. 25. The 
waiver of either his constitutional or statutory right to a jury trial requires something 
more than merely failing to maintain contact with his attorney prior to trial, especially 
where there is no indication from the record that Mr. Zavala-Perez was informed of such 
a consequence. Therefore, the trial court erred in determining that Mr. Zavala-Perez had 
waived his right to a jury trial. On remand, this case should be re-set for a jury trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE IN ABSENTIA BENCH TRIAL VIOLATED MR. ZAVALA-
PEREZ' RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AND UTAH RULE OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 17(a). 
With no showing that Mr. Zavala-Perez received notice of the November 26 
bench trial or that his failure to appear on that date was voluntary, the trial court erred in 
conducting the bench trial in absentia. Both the Utah and United States Constitutions 
guarantee the right of a defendant to be present. See Utah Const, art. I, § 12 (stating 
"accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person99); Portuondo v. Agard. 529 
U.S. 61,65 (2000) (articulating Sixth Amendment right to be present); see also Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-l-6(l)(a) (Supp. 2001) (defendant has right to "appear in person and 
defend in person99). 
Like all rights, the right to be present may be waived by a defendant. See State v. 
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Anderson, 929 P.2d I \o'i9 1il^/ i A A, vUtah 1996). I low ever , w a n c r o\ the nght i. he 
present must be both knowing and voluntary. See State v. Wanosik , 2001 UT App ..-* i, 
f 10, 31 I \ 3d 615, cert, granted. 4 
i rininiiil Pun nlim i uihlir, both Ihe m,»ht lu be present and the constitutional 
requirements for waiver of that right. Rule 17(a) states, in pert inent part, that: 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the r ight to appear and defend 
in person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at the 
trial with the following exceptions: 
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant 
may consent in writing to trial in his absence; 
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the 
defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant 
of the time for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a 
verdict or judgment entered therein shall have the same effect as if 
defendant had been present 
(emphasis aikioi 11 I Inr. in i i <l< m ii i a defendant has waived the right to be 
present, either written consent or voluntary absence after not ice must be shown. 
As to the first exception, written consent, there is n o indication in the record that 
Mr. Zavala-Perez consented, in v 'iilmj1, i ullk'i w i v , U i IVMI HI Ins .iibvnit r I hi1. (" mil 
\ .iiiii ii pi fsiiiiii1' ",tidi consent based on a silent record. 
As to the second exception, a defendant may be tried in absentia if: (1) he receives 
adequate notice ofthe time and place of the proceeding; and (, I o •id <illn uxviviiig .nuh 
imtiiv llii i ih if nil!11 I IMI i Sec Wanosik, .MKH IN App 2 4 1 , ^ 1 0 - 2 0 . Neither 
requirement is met in the instant case. 
First, the record contains no indication that Mr. Zavala-Perez received any notice 
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of his November 26, 2001 bench trial. SeeR. 7-16. The record does show that on 
September 12 Mr. Zavala-Perez was given notice of his first bench trial setting on 
October 29, 2001. R. 13-16. However, the record contains no notice for the November 
26 bench trial date. Indeed, not only was no official notice of the new date given to Mr. 
Zavala-Perez, the October 29 bench trial setting was continued by stipulation of counsel 
without an appearance in court by either counsel or Mr. Zavala-Perez. R. 25-26. 
Apparently, defense counsel did make some attempt to contact Mr. Zavala-Perez 
via telephone regarding the new date, but was unsuccessful. R. 26; 53[1]. Defense 
counsel admits that he would have been more diligent in attempting to contact Mr. 
Zavala-Perez regarding the new date, but firmly believed that the bench trial would be 
stricken and a new jury trial date set. R. 28. Whatever efforts were made by defense 
counsel were severely hindered by the fact that Mr. Zavala-Perez speaks Spanish and 
defense counsel did not. R. 26. The only verified contact with Mr. Zavala-Perez was by 
a Salt Lake Legal Defender Association ("LDA") interpreter informing him that his trial 
had been continued to a new date, and that he would be contacted later as to what that 
new date was. Id. Although the interpreter recalls leaving a message with Mr. Zavala-
Perez' wife regarding Ihe new date, Mr. Zavala-Perez indicates that he never received 
that message or any other contact from LDA informing him of the date. R. 26. 
Additionally, even though they had a current address on file, LDA did not send written 
notice of the new date to Mr. Zavala-Perez. Id. Finally, the record indicates that Mr. 
10 
Zavala-Perez made numerous attempts to contact his attorney via telephone leaving a 
"stack of messages" regarding his case, but that those phone calls were never returned. 
R.53[l]. 
Jin Miu.il11in pii'srnlnl iilmw1 i\ f.n ifinn\nl from, the situation addressed in State 
v. Wagstaff. 772 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), in which this Court determined 
that actual notice to the defendant's attorney resulted in constructive notice to the 
defendant. In Wagstaffc the defendant it 
990o Furthermore, the defendant's attorney "went to great lengths to attempt to contact" 
the defendant, sending numerous written notices of the trial date to every known address 
of the defendant and the addresses of his relatives. Id. 
In contrast to Wagstaff, the in, u ml iiii I Ins UIM," nulicalc? Ii it n mi nil *MI!I« n 
notice of the new date was provided to any of the parties involved. R. 7 16. Obviously, 
counsel for the state and the defense learned of the new date, but neither party was 
actually served with written notice as required by Rule 3 of the Utah Rules on riminal 
] lrou , ' lun Nl'ii III in i I I I I in in i ill n ill ii 111 ill Mi ' / u . i l i IIViv, lui l Id l llir • l,ili m l i i i ln l 
to attempt to contact his attorney. Indeed, the record shows that Mr. Zavala-Perez made 
2Rule 3 provides that: 
(a) All written motions, notices, and pleadings shall be filed with the court 
and served on all other parties. 
(b) Whenever service is required or permitted to be made upon a party 
represented by an attorney, the service shall be made upon the attorney, unless 
service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Service upon the attorney 
or upon a party shall be made in the manner provided in civil actions. 
11 
numerous attempts to contact defense counsel. R. 53[1]. Defense counsel failed to 
return those phone calls and failed to send written notice. R. 26; 53[1]. As such, Mr. 
Zavala-Perez received neither actual nor constructive notice of his new bench trial date. 
Absent such notice, Mr. Zavala-Perez cannot be said to have knowingly waived his right 
to be present. See Wanosik, 2001 UT App. 241, ^19 n.8 (noting that knowing waiver 
can be inferred from notice of time and place of proceeding). Therefore, it was error for 
the trial court to proceed in Mr. Zaval-Perez' absence. 
Second, even if Mr. Zavala-Perez received notice of the November 26 bench trial 
date and had, thus, knowingly failed to appear, the "trial court may not assume a 
defendant's knowing absence is voluntary, but rather is required to determine whether a 
defendant's absence is in fact voluntary." Id. at ^19 (emphasis in original). In Wanosik. 
this Court set forth in detail the requirements for a finding that the defendant's absence is 
voluntary. See id. at^[19-25.3 
In general, whether a defendant's absence is voluntary is "determined by 
considering the totality of the circumstances." Id. at TJ21 (quoting State v. Wagstaff, 772 
P.2d 987, 990 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). Moreover, it is the state's burden to make a 
3Although Wanosik deals specifically with only sentencing in absentia, this Court 
noted that the right to be present is identical with respect to both trial and sentencing. See 
id at TJ10 n.l (noting that there is "no basis on which to distinguish between trial and 
sentencing in our analysis of a defendant's right to be present and a defendant's voluntary 
waiver of that right"); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 22(b) ("On the same grounds that a 
defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in 
defendant's absence."). 
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preliminary showing that the defendant's absence is voluntary. See id. at ^21. Such a 
showing must be based upon "reasonable inquiry." Id. at ^ 22. 
This Court further suggested that such "reasonable inquiry" include: 
(I) inquiry of law enforcement agencies to determine whether the defendant 
is incarcerated,(2) inquiry of local hospitals as to whether the defendant has 
been admitted to one of them; (3) inquiry of the defendant's employer, if the 
employer can be readily determined, as to the employer's possible knowledge 
of the defendant's whereabouts; (4) a reasonably diligent attempt to contact 
defendant at his residence or other place counsel knows the defendant to 
frequent; (5) inquiry of Pretrial Services or other entity supervising 
defendant's presentence release; and (6) inquiry of any bail bond company or 
other person or entity posting bond to secure defendant's appearance. 
Id. at 23 (internal citations omitted). 
Once the state has made a "reasonable inquiry" and "compelling reason for the 
< " - • 
properly inferred." IdL Even then, defense counsel must have the opportunity to rebut 
the state's preliminary showing of voluntariness. See. id, at TJ24. 
In Wanosik, the defendant was sentenced in absentia after receiving notice of the 
In in1 iiiwl p • ig Id at' |5 1 1 le ti ial cc i it I: did nc Il: inqi lit: e it 101 
state offer any evidence as to the voluntariness of the defendant's absence. The trial 
court merely made findings that the defendant had not kept in contact with defense 
counsel in (In1 In ill mil [till llascil iiii iilinr.i lindin^s ilium III liriiill m nnrl .issiiiin d III ml 
the defendant's absence was voluntary. Id Ihis Court rejected such an assumption, 
stating that a defendant's failure to maintain contact with counsel or the court indicated 
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"nothing more than that no one knew why [the defendant] was absent." IcL_at ^ J20. 
As in Wanosik, none of the procedures outlined by this Court were followed in 
Mr. Zavala-Perez' case. The state did not even attempt to make a showing that Mr. 
Zavala-Perez' absence was voluntary prior to proceeding with the bench trial. R. 53[1]. 
Indeed, far from showing that his absence was voluntary, the record actually indicates 
that Mr. Zavala-Perez was actively attempting to contact his attorney prior to the 
proceeding. Id, Furthermore, the trial court did not make any findings that his absence 
was voluntary. Id The only inquiry made by the trial court was whether the state 
wished to proceed in Mr. Zavala-Perez' absence. Id. As such, voluntary absence 
cannot be assumed and the trial court erred in holding the bench trial in absentia. In the 
end, neither counsel or the court knew why Mr. Zavala-Perez was absent, and therefore 
a continuance was appropriate. See State v. Houtz. 714 P.2d 677, 678-79 (Utah 1986). 
Additionally, the deprivation of Mr. Zavala-Perez' right to be present was 
prejudicial. In Wanosik. the defendant sent a letter to the trial court stating that he had 
no "legitimate excuse" for his absence from sentencing. Wanosik, 2001 UT App. 241, 
1f26. Therefore, this Court determined that the defendant's absence from sentencing 
was voluntary and, thus, the trial court's failure resulted in no prejudice. Id. 
Such is not the case here. No subsequent showing has been made that Mr. 
Zavala-Perez' absence was voluntary. Also, as Mr. Zavala-Perez and his wife were to 
be the only defense witnesses, the bench trial in absentia prevented defense counsel 
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from presenting any ev idence or defense in his behalf. R. 28; 53[30] . This is especially 
important in a DUI trial w h e r e n o evidence o f a chemical test exists. In this class of 
cases, the state n n ist show tl mt the defendant was "incapable of safely operating 
motor vehicle I Jtah C o d e A n n . §41-6-44 (1999) . Such a case rests largely, if not 
exclusively, upon the de fendan t ' s performance on the standardized field sobriety tests. 
On cross-examination, defense counsel w a s able to elicit testimony from the officer that 
ml Ilic tesls air mini i (in HI I in led i \.IIH III!11 mi mi i lln pin i nlu il niaiim i iilllin reliaiitlih ml (In tests 
is diminished. R. 53[17] . T h e pol ice officer then testified that the tests he performed on 
Mr. Zavala-Perez deviated from the s tandardized manner in which he had been trained 
to perform those tes t s - resu l t ing in the tests being less reliable than if they had been 
petlomicil p m p u l K. S31X, ?4„ 1] 14|. 
Given the tes t imony o f the officer and his obvious negligence in the 
administration of the field sobrie ty tests, the test imony of Mr. Zavala-Perez and his wife 
became even more crucial in this instance, and had they been present at the trial, a valid 
defense to the charges wou ld h a v e been presented Had Mr Zavala-Perez « 
been al lowed to testify, they w o u l d have been able to offer reasonable and innocent 
explanations for his pe r fo rmance on the field sobriety tests and the other things testified 
t( i 111 II111 mi 111 n i i I 11 n w * < i in If i I  in , i' i II, i IV11 • < Mil I I i in i mi Il II II in 11 11111 in mi III in mi i in I . \> »i n II in, 11 c 
was prejudiced by the trial court's decision to proceed in his absence. 
In sum, the right of a criminal defendant to be present is guaranteed by both the 
state and federal constitutions. That right may be waived only if made both knowingly 
and voluntarily. At a minimum, knowing waiver requires notice of the time and place of 
the proceeding. The record is silent as to whether Mr. Zavala-Perez received such 
notice. Moreover, in order for the trial court to find that a defendant's absence is 
voluntary, the state must make a preliminary showing based upon "reasonable inquiry." 
The state made no such showing here and, without such a showing, the trial court may 
not assume that Mr. Zavala-Perez' absence was voluntary. Finally, the trial court's error 
in proceeding without Mr. Zavala-Perez was prejudicial as it prevented him from 
presenting any defense or evidence in his behalf. 
II. MR. ZAVALA-PEREZ DID NOT WAIVE EITHER HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY RIGHTS TO A JURY TRIAL. 
A. Mr. Zavala-Perez Did Not Waive His State Constitutional Right to a Jury 
Trial By Failing to Maintain Contact With His Attorney. 
Mr. Zavala-Perez did not waive his right to a jury trial under the Utah 
Constitution. Under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, there is no 
right to a jury trial for "petty offenses." See Blanton v. North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 
541 (1989). For purposes of the right to a jury trial, whether an offense is "petty" is 
determined according to the severity of the penalty imposed. Specifically regarding DUI 
charges, the United States Supreme Court has determined that, despite the additional 
penalties imposed for DUI convictions, they are "petty offenses," and thus, not subject to 
the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a jury trial. IdL_at 542-44. 
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Nevertheless, the right to a jury trial in all criminal prosecutions, "petty" or not, Is 
guaranteed by the Utah Constitution. Article I, Section 10 of the Utah Constitution 
provides: 
j n c a p j t a | c a s e s the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In 
courts of general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of 
eight jurors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four 
jurors. Iii criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases 
three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be 
waived unless demanded. 
Tin 1 ll.il) Siii|iiii iiiii « 'iHiiiili liihi1* ttitiTpitlml \rln lr I Soli III III 1 iM|inrifi^ i |iny 
trial in all civil cases. See International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor & 
Implement Inc.. 626 P.2d 418, 421 (Utah 1981). The Court in International Harvester 
idled health up HI NIL ailual debates nil (In diallcis ml illln I Ilili I 'onstitution. See id. at 
419-20. Specifically, the court found that there was a "virtually unanimous intention on 
the part of the framers of the [Utah] Constitution to preserve a constitutional right to trial 
by jury in ^ cases and in noncapital criminal cases." IcL at 4} he court further 
" - i l i n iiin t 
jurors to be used in courts of original jurisdiction and in courts of inferior jurisdiction 
presupposes the existence of the basic right itself M 
Specifically regarding Mi Zavala-Perez5 right . mry trial for a class B 
misdemeanor, Article I, Section 10 states that "[i]n courts of inferior jurisdiction . r 
shall consist of four jurors." This is especially important in the context of class B and C 
misdemeanors because those are the only criminal matters tried with four jurors. See_ 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-5 (1999). Thus, under the reasoning adopted by the court in 
International Harvester, that Article I, Section 10 expressly provides for the number of 
jurors in class B and C misdemeanors shows that the framers of the Utah Constitution 
intended to secure the right to a jury trial for criminal defendants, such as Mr. Zavala-
Perez. As stated by the court, it is not "plausible that the framers would mandate the 
number of jurors to be used in a jury, and the number of jurors required to return a 
verdict, without intending to secure the basic right itself." International Harvester. 626 
P.2d at 419: see also State v. Black. 551 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1976) (stating "[t]he right 
guaranteed by the Constitution of Utah is to be tried by a jury"). Therefore, Mr. Zavala-
Perez has a right under the Utah Constitution to a jury trial. 
In addition to having a right to a jury trial, Mr. Zavala-Perez' conduct in failing to 
maintain contact with his attorney is insufficient for waiver of that constitutional right. 
It is well-established that waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary. See Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 579 (1987); Moran v. Burbine. 
475 U.S. 412,421 (1986); Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); United States v. 
Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1431-33 (10th Cir. 1995). Further, the state has a "heavy 
burden" to show waiver, and courts must "indulge every reasonable presumption against 
waiver." Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464. 
In order for a court to find that a defendant's waiver is knowing and intelligent, 
the "totality of the circumstances" must show that the waiver was made with a "full 
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awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the 
decision to abandon it." Moran, 475 U.S. at 421. In the instant case, this standard is 
simply not met. There is no indication in the record that Mr. Zavala-Perez was informed 
or aware that his right to a jury trial could be waived by failing to maintain contact with 
his attorney. Absent such a showing, waiver may not be presumed or inferred from a 
silent record. See Estelle v. Williams. 425 U.S. 501, 527 n.8 (1976); Bovkin v. Alabama, 
395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969); Gideon v. Wainwright 372 U.S. 335, 369 (1963). 
B. MR. ZAVALA-PEREZ DID NOT WAIVE HIS STATUTORY RIGHT 
TO A JURY TRIAL. 
Even if Mr. Zavala-Perez does not have a constitutional right to a jury trial, he 
does have a statutory right to a jury trial. Further, the trial court erroneously concluded 
that Mr. Zavala-Perez has waived this statutory right to a jury trial merely by failing to 
maintain contact with his attorney prior to trial. Under Utah law, criminal defendants 
have a right to a jury trial in all cases except infractions. See Salt Lake City v. Roseto, 
2002 UT App. 66, fflj 8-14,44 P.3d 835. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1999) provides, in pertinent part: 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district where the offense is alleged to have been committed; 
(2) In addition: 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon 
a plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when 
19 
trial by jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a 
judgment by a magistrate. 
Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in pertinent part: 
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a jury 
in open court with the approval of the court and the consent of the 
prosecution. 
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes a 
written demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise. 
No jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction. 
This Court recently held in Rosetothat, as long as the requirements of Rule 17(d) 
are met, a criminal defendant has a right to a jury trial for all misdemeanor and felony 
cases. See Roseto 2002 UT App. 66, ^ f 11. Here, although no written demand for a jury 
trial was made, a jury trial was verbally demanded at the pretrial conference and the trial 
court ordered that a jury trial be set. R. 9-12; 18-19. In addition, on November 20, Mr. 
Zavala-Perez made a written demand for a jury trial in his motion to strike the bench trial 
and demand for jury trial. R. 17-20. Even without a written demand, the requirements 
of Rule 17(d) were met in that "the court order[ed] otherwise." Once a jury trial has been 
set by the court, no written demand is necessary. Having met with the requirements of 
Rule 17(d) and being charged with a misdemeanor, Mr. Zavala-Perez was entitled to a 
jury trial in this matter. The only question remaining is whether he waived that right. 
Although not a strict as the requirements for waiver of a constitutional right, a 
statutory right cannot be waived unless "the record as a whole reflects the [defendant's] 
reasonable understanding of the proceedings and awareness of the right." State v. 
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Bvington. 936 P.2d 1112, 1117 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (finding that defendant waived 
statutory right to counsel where Sixth Amendment right did not apply). Moreover, the 
defendant must receive at least some admonishments regarding the potential 
consequences of waiver. Id. (citations omitted). 
Here, the record is silent as to Mr. Zavala-Perez' understanding of the proceedings, 
his awareness of his rights, and any admonishments given by the trial court. The record 
only shows that Mr. Zavala-Perez failed to contact his attorney prior to his jury trial.4 
The record does not show that Mr. Zavala-Perez was aware that he had to contact his 
attorney prior to trial or that failure to do so would result in waiver of his right to a jury 
trial As such, waiver, even of a statutory right, may not be presumed. As stated by the 
Utah Supreme Court, "[t]here is nothing in the record before the Court to show that 
defendant's statutory right was properly waived by defendant.... no waiver of a jury was 
ever made by defendant in open court or on the record. Such waiver will not be presumed 
from a silent record." State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297-98 (Utah 1986); see also State v. 
Williams, 626 P.2d 145,146 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) ("We cannot infer a waiver [of a 
statutory right] from a silent record."); State v. Warren, 345 S.E.2d 437,439 (N.C. Ct. 
4Although not published, this Court's decision in West Valley City v. Bhatia. 2000 
UT App. 240 (unpublished memorandum decision) [attached hereto as Addendum lfCfl], 
provides direct support for Mr. Zavala-Perez5 claim. In Rhatia, the defendant, after 
complying with the requirements of Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
signed an agreement with the trial court stating that the right to a jury would be waived if 
he failed to contact his attorney at least two days prior to the trial. This court found such 
a waiver ineffective. 
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App. 1986) (holding waiver of a statutory right ,fcannot be inferred from a silent record"). 
In sum, Mr. Zavala-Perez has a right to a jury trial under the Utah Constitution, 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6, and Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Criminal procedure. 
Whatever the source of that right, Mr. Zavala-Perez' failure to maintain contact with his 
attorney prior to the trial does not operate as a waiver, especially where the record is 
silent as to his understanding of the right. As such, the trial court's finding of waiver 
was erroneous and a new jury trial date should be set on remand. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, Mr. Zavala-Perez respectfully requests that the guilty verdict 
based upon the bench trial in absentia on November 26 be overturned and that a new trial 
be scheduled. In addition, Mr. Zavala-Perez respectfully request that a jury trial be 
scheduled in this matter rather than a new bench trial. 
DATED this 1*4*** day of June, 2002. 
MICHAEL MISNER 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
\y<%r\J\AA 
PATRICK W. CORUM 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
Third District Court, State of Utah 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
450 South State Street, P.O. Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860 
SENTENCE/JUDGMENT/COMMITMENT/ORDER 
Criminal/Traffic 
Case Number. Plaintiff 
VS-
JCSC 7mt(h- PtrcTL 
Defendant 
Tape number C # 
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Defendant to Commence Serv ing Jail Sentence 
/3C0 Fine Amt. $_ Susp. $_ Fee$. Fine Bal $. 
Payment Schedule: Pay $_ 
Court Costs $ 
(00 ) 0C per month/1 st Pmt. Due 31 &L 
TOTAL FINE(S) DUE $ 
Last Pmt. Due 
'
U C
 through O.QU/ f Community Service/WP. 
Restitution $ Pay to: • Court • Victim • Show Proof to Court 
Attorney Fees $ 
Probation / b P i n i h I^Good Behavior • AP&P • ACEC • Other 
Terms of probat ion: 
iSf No Further Violat ions • Counseling thru ' 
• AAMeetings / wk /month ^Classes 3 ^ / ? diH—{^i CtQ-ii 
D Follow Program 
• No Alcohol 
D Antibuse 
• Employment 
• Proof of 
• I n / O u t i x ^ x ^ n x ^ f ^ ^ i ^ ^&L-hdJLlJl^^ 
D Health Testing 
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•:•>•-- >-. •••-4- i-
j¥'T^ ••- • 
Plea in Abeyance Diversion 
Review / / at 
compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
ding special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
> and services) during this proceeding should call Third District 
irt at 238-7391, at least three working days prior to the proceeding. -Zr'-fTv BXstrict Court Judge 
PEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF JUDGEMENT STAMP USED A T D i R F r T i n ' w 
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ADDENDUM B 
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS 77-1-6 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 319, 135 P.2d 242, modified on rehearing and 





c t l 0 n
' A judge or justice when acting in the role of 
^ " magistrate was limited to the jurisdiction and 
Information. powers conferred by law upon magistrates. Van 
Once the information is authorized, its pre- Dam v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1977). 
sentment and filing are not acts that the pros- A judicial officer functioning as a magistrate 
ecuting attorney must personally perform. is not functioning as a circuit court or other 
State ex rel. Cannon v. Leary, 646 P.2d 727 court of record. Because magistrates are not 
(Utah 1982). courts of record when they conduct preliminary 
. . hearings and issue bindover orders, under the 
Jurisdiction. current jurisdictional statutes their orders are 
District judge was magistrate entitled to hold
 n o t immediately appealable. State v. Hum-
preliminary examinations in case of misde-
 h r e y 8 2 3 p 2 d 464 (Utah 1991). 
meanor. State v. Mclntyre, 92 Utah 177,66 P.2d * 
879(1937). Cited in State v. Milligan, 727 R2d 213 
A justice of the peace has power to issue (Utah 1986); State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 
search warrants. Allen v. Holbrook, 103 Utah (Utah 1998). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Indictments tions §§ 4, 8; 48A C.J.S. Judges §§ 4, 161; 80 
and Informations § 1. C.J.S. Sheriffs and Constables § 1; 81A C.J.S. 
C.J.S. — 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informa- States § 139. 
77-1-4. Conviction to precede punishment. 
No person shall be punished for a public offense until convicted in a court 
having jurisdiction. 
History: C. 1953, 77-1-4, enacted by L. prived of life or liberty without due process of 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. law, Utah Const., Art. I, § 7. 
Cross-References. — No person to be de-
77-1-5. Prosecuting party. 
A criminal action for any violation of a state statute shall be prosecuted in 
the name of the state of Utah. A criminal action for violation of any county or 
municipal ordinance shall be prosecuted in the name of the governmental 
entity involved. , 
History: C. 1953, 77-1-5, enacted by L. conducted in name of "the State of Utah," Utah 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. Const., Art. VIII, § 16. 
Cross-References. — Prosecutions to be 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 21. 
77-1-6. Rights of defendant. 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
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(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in 
his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district 
where the offense is alleged to have been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be 
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail 
and if the business of the court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or 
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a 
husband against his wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a 
plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by 
jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a 
magistrate. 
History: C. 1953, 77-1-5, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
Cross-References. — Attorneys, rights in 
disbarment proceedings, § 78-51-16. 
Constitutional rights of accused, Utah 
Const., Art. I, § 12. 
Counsel for indigents, § 77-32-301 et seq. 
Discharge of defendant turned state's wit-
ness, § 77-17-2. 
Dismissal without trial, Rule 25, U.R.Cr.P. 
Due process of law, Utah Const., Art. I, § 7. 
Errors and defects not affecting substantial 
rights disregarded, Rule 30, U.R.Cr.P. 
Husband or wife not competent witness 
against or for each other without consent, ex-
ceptions, § 78-24-8. 
Jury trial and waiver thereof, Utah Const., 
Art. I, § 10; Rule 17, U.R.Cr.P. 
Lineup procedures, § 77-8-1 et seq. 
Multiple prosecutions and double jeopardy, 
§ 76-1-401 et seq. 
Ordinance violation cases, jeopardy in, § 10-
7-65. 
Subpoena for witnesses for impecunious de-
fendant in criminal case, § 21-5-14. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Appearance at trial in prison clothing. 
—Waiver. 
Confrontation of witness. 
—Depositions. 
—Right to interpreter. 
—Stipulation of testimony 
—Testimony of accessory at former trial. 
—Testimony at preliminary hearing. 
Copy of accusation. 






Fee before final judgment. 
Jury trial. 
— Impartial jury. 
Preliminary hearing. 
Presence at trial. 
—Waiver. 
Public trial. 
Right to appeal. 
Right to counsel. 
—Waiver. 
Self-incrimination. 
—Claiming and waiving privilege. 
—Confessions. 
Speedy trial. 
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quested or must identify explicitly those por-
tions of the request with respect to which no 
responsive material will be provided. Secondly, 
when the prosecution agrees to produce any of 
the material requested, it must continue to 
disclose such material on an ongoing basis to 
the defense. State v. Knight, 734 R2d 913 (Utah 
1987). 
Witnesses. 
A circuit court judge acted well within his 
discretion in ordering the state to disclose the 
identity of a witness and the details of a crim-
inal transaction the circuit court found to be 
material to a pending criminal prosecution, 
where the state itself provided "good cause," for 
purposes of Subdivision (a)(5), by representing 
that it needed to keep defendant's money to use 
at trial, when the only logical use of the money 
would of necessity entail proof of the details of 
the transaction in which the informant was 
involved. Cannon v. Keller, 692 R2d 740 (Utah 
1984). 
After the defendant injected a degree of sur-
prise into the proceedings, the State reacted 
properly by contacting a rebuttal witness 
known to have some expertise in the relevant 
area and notifying defense cousel as soon as 
possible who he was and what his general 
purpose would be. Therefore, the state was not 
precluded from calling this rebuttal witness not 
disclosed before trial in circumstances where it, 
in good faith, had no reason to expect the need 
for the witness before trial. State v. Tennyson, 
850 P.2d 461 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Cited in State v. Fierst, 692 R2d 751 (Utah 
1984); State v. Collier, 736 P.2d 231 (Utah 
1987); State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879 (Utah 
1988); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 
1988); State v. Sawyers, 819 P.2d 806 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991); State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 
(Utah 1994); State v. Vargas, 2001 UT 5, 20 P.3d 
271. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Comment, Confron-
tation Rights and Preliminary Hearings, 1986 
Utah L. Rev. 75. 
C.J.S. — 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 486 et 
seq. 
A.L.R. — Right of accused in state courts to 
inspection or disclosure of evidence in posses-
sion of prosecution, 7 A.L.R.3d 8. 
Right of defendant in criminal case to inspec-
tion of statement of prosecution's witness for 
purposes of cross-examination or impeach-
ment, 7 A.L.R.3d 181. 
Accused's right to inspection of minutes of 
state grand jury, 20 A.L.R.3d 7. 
Interference by prosecution with defense 
counsel's pretrial interrogation of witnesses, 90 
A.L.R.3d 1231. 
Accused's right to discovery or inspection of 
"rap sheets" or similar police records about 
prosecution witnesses, 95 A.L.R.3d 832. 
Accused's right to depose prospective wit-
nesses before trial in state court, 2 A.L.R.4th 
704. 
Sanctions against defense in criminal case 
for failure to comply with discovery require-
ments, 9A.L.R.4th 837. 
Right of accused in state courts to inspection 
or disclosure of tape recording of his own state-
ments, 10 A.L.R.4th 1092. 
Necessity or permissibility of mental exami-
nation to determine competency or credibility 
of complainant in sexual offense prosecution, 
45A.L.R.4th 310. 
What is accused's "statement" subject to state 
court criminal discovery, 57 A.L.R.4th 827. 
Criminal law: dog scent discrimination line-
ups, 63 A.L.R.4th 143. 
Right of defendant in criminal contempt pro-
ceeding to obtain information by deposition, 33 
A.L.R.5th 761. 
Illegal drugs or narcotics involved in alleged 
offense as subject to discovery by defendant 
under Rule 16 of Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, 109 A.L.R. Fed. 363. 
Rule 17. The trial. 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at the trial 
with the following exceptions: 
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may con-
sent in writing to trial in his absence; 
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's 
voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial 
shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered 
therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present; and 
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good cause 
shown which may include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous conduct. 
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal 
attendance of the defendant at the trial. 
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in the following order: 
(1) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custodv; 
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(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody; 
(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance; and 
(4) misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance. 
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a jury 
in open court wi th the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution. 
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes 
wri t ten demand a t least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise. 
No jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction. 
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as specified 
in Section 78-46-5, U.C.A. 1953. 
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the consent of the 
accused and the approval of the court, by stipulation in writing or made orally 
in open court, proceed to trial or complete a trial then in progress with any 
number of jurors less than otherwise required. 
(g) After the j u ry has been impaneled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in 
the following order: 
(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated; 
(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement and the 
defense may make an opening statement or reserve it until the prosecution has 
rested; 
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge; 
(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case; 
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the 
court, for good cause, otherwise permits; 
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time, the 
court shall instruct the jury; and 
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both sides 
without argument , the prosecution shall open the argument, the defense shall 
follow and the prosecution may close by responding to the defense argument. 
The court may set reasonable limits upon the argument of counsel for each 
party and the t ime to be allowed for argument. 
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an 
al ternate juror h a s been selected, the case shall proceed using the alternate 
juror. If no a l te rna te has been selected, the parties may stipulate to proceed 
with the number of jurors remaining. Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged 
and a new trial ordered. 
(i) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to view the place 
in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, or in which any other 
material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body under the 
charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some person 
appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer shall be sworn that while 
the jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no person other than the person so 
appointed to speak to them nor to do so himself on any subject connected with 
the trial and to re turn them into court without unnecessary delay or at a 
specified time. 
<j) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to separate 
or are sequestered, they shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty 
not to converse among themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselves to 
be addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their 
duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally 
submitted to them. 
(k) Upon re t i r ing for deliberation, the jury may take with them the 
instructions of the court and all exhibits which have been received as evidence, 
except exhibits t h a t should not, in the opinion of the court, be in the possession 
of the jury, such as exhibits of unusual size, weapons or contraband. The court 
shall permit the ju ry to view exhibits upon request. Jurors are entitled to take 
notes during the tr ial and to have those notes with them duriner deliberations. 
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As necessary, the court shall provide jurors with writing materials and instruct 
the jury on taking and using notes. 
(1) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept together 
in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they agree upon a 
verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except by 
order of the court, the officer having them under his charge shall not allow any 
communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to ask them 
if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he shall not, before the verdict is 
gendered, communicate to any person the state of their deliberations or the 
verdict agreed upon. 
(m) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed 
on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge 
of them, who shall communicate such request to the court. The court may then 
direct that the jury be brought before the court where, in the presence of the 
defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry or advise the 
jury that no further instructions shall be given. Such response shall be 
recorded. The court may in its discretion respond to the inquiry in writing 
without having the jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry and 
the response thereto shall be entered in the record. 
(n) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face, it may be 
corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out 
again. 
(o) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion 
of all the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information or 
indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not 
legally sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included 
offense. 
(Amended effective November 1, 2001.) 
Advisory Commit tee Note. — Paragraph 
(k). The committee recommends amending 
paragraph (k) to establish the right of jurors to 
take notes and to have those notes with them 
daring deliberations. The committee recom-
mends removing depositions from the para-
graph not in order to permit the jurors to have 
depositions but to recognize that depositions 
are not evidence. Depositions read into evi-
dence will be treated as any other oral testi-
mony. These amendments and similar amend-
ments to the Rules of Civil Procedure will make 
the two provisions identical. 
Amendment Notes . — The 2001 amend-
ment made one stylistic change in Subdivision 
(g) and rewrote Subdivision (k). 
Cross-References. — Capital felony, pen-
alty execution of penalty §§ 76-3-206, 76-3-
207, 77-19-1 etseq. 
Fees, pavment by state in criminal cases, 
§ 21-6-5. 
Husband and wife as witness for or against 
each other, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 12: §§ 77-
1-6, 78-24-8. 
Jurors and jury, § 78-46-1 et seq. 
Report of testimony of witness taken at pre-
liminary examination as admissible, Rule 7. 
Right to jury trial, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 
10; § 77-1-6. 
When judgment rendered, Rule 22. 
When verdict rendered, Rule 21. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Contact with jurors. 
Dl, disabled, or disqualified jurors. 
—Agreement to proceed. 








—Requests for further instructions. 
"""—Absence of counsel. 
*^ -— Absence of defendant. 
"——Written response. 
Requests for re-readinff of testimonv. 
Jury views. 
Motions for directed verdict. 
Presence at trial. 
—Absence due to counsel error. 
—Court ordered removal. 
—Defendant in custody. 
—Jury instruction. 
— Motions and pleas. 
— Voluntary absence. 
—Waiver. 
Intoxication. 
Trial by jury. 
— Failure of defendant to waive. 
— Request by defendant. 
Refusal. 
— Reauest bv nrosecutor. 
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Rule 21.5. Repealed. 
Repeals . — Rule 21.5, establishing proce- ity, was repealed effective January 1, 1996. For 
dure for pleas claiming mental illness or insan- similar provisions, see § 77-16a-103. 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the 
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two 
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportu-
nity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of 
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. 
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any 
information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's 
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a 
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arres t may be 
issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall 
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include 
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of 
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal 
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its 
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to 
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or 
prison and shall make the officers return on the commitment and file it with 
the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, at any time. 
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose 
sentence in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court 
retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the Department 
of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202( 1Kb), the court 
shall so specify in the sentencing order. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1995; January 1, 1996.) 
Cross-References. — Pre-sentence investi- and probation proceedings. Rule 1101, U.R.E. 
gation, § 76-3-404. Suspending impOvSition of sentence and plac-
Rules of evidence inapplicable to sentencing ing defendant on probation, $ 77-18-1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
— Presence of defendant. 
—Time. 
Continuance for defendant. 
Waiver. 
— Waiver of rights. 
Statements before sentencing. 
— Defendant. 
Validitv of conviction. 
Cited. " 
Advising defendant of right to appeal. 
Trial court s failure to again advise defendant 
of his right to appeal at sentencing was harm-
less error where trial court had informed him of 
such right at the trial and after the verdict, and 
he did not object to the timeliness of the courts 







— Habitual offenders. 
— Indefinite suspension of sentence. 
Sentencing hearing. 





— Presence of counsel. 
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right to a jury if he did not contact his attorney two 
days before trial. This purported waiver was not 
sufficient. Bhatia made a written demand for a jury trial 
in accordance with Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 
17(3)(d). There is insufficient evidence in the record to 
suggest he knowingly and intelligently waived a jury 
trial. See State v. Moosman. 794 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah 
1990) (stating defendant must understand nature and 
extent of waiver of jury trial and waiver must be 
informed and knowledgeable). 
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's determination 
that Bhatia waived his right to counsel and a jury trial 
and remand the case for such further proceedings as 
may now be proper. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
Before BENCH. BILLINGS, and DAVIS. JJ. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
PER CURIAM. 
*1 Absent evidence in the record of affirmative, 
knowing and intelligent action by [defendant] that 
might reasonably be construed as a waiver, we must 
conclude that there has been no waiver and [defendant] 
was entitled to be represented by counsel at trial even 
if he chose not to be there himself. 
Wazstaff v. Barnes. 802 P.2d 774. 779 (Utah 
Ct.App.1990). There is nothing in the record to indicate 
that Bhatia took affirmative, knowing, and intelligent 
action to waive representation. In fact, West Valley 
concedes that the trial court erred in concluding Bhatia 
waived his right to counsel. West Valley goes on to 
argue that this error can be corrected by resentencing 
Bhatia to no jail time. We disagree. Because he was 
sentenced to jail, Bhatia was entitled to counsel absent 
a proper waiver. See Lavton v. Lonzcrier. 943 P.2d 
655. 658 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (interpreting Scott v. 
Illinois. 440 U.S. 367. 99 S.Ct. 1158 (1979) as 
imposing after-the-fact test to determine if person 
charged with misdemeanor is entitled to counsel). 
The trial court also concluded that Bhatia waived his 
right to a jury trial by signing an agreement to waive his 
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